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Merger Litigation Under the Sherman Act
Choice or Echo
I. INTRODUCTION
Although the Sherman Antitrust Act' is in its seventy-fifth year,
an effective interpretation of the law has eluded the courts. The
earliest Sherman Act cases, using a literal interpretation, construed
the act as outlawing every combination resulting in any restraint of
trade.! However, in the Standard Oil case,' the Supreme Court
enunciated the so-called "rule of reason" under which the Sherman
Act is interpreted as applying only to unreasonable restraints of trade.
The courts and litigants have since faced difficulty with the applica-
tion of this test.
Nowhere are the problems of Sherman Act interpretation more ap-
parent than in the area of merger litigation. Early developments
made it painfully clear that the Sherman Act, as interpreted by the
courts, was not a very effective weapon with which to attack the
practice of using mergers and acquisitions to gain monopoly power.
In 1914 Congress passed the Clayton Act.4 Section 7 of the act repre-
sented a legislative attempt to prevent the attainment of a monopoly
through merger or acquisition by imposing stricter standards than
the courts had imposed under the Sherman Act. The original act out-
lawed acquisitions the effects of which "may be substantially to
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.' ' Thus, the acquisi-
tion of stock' of a competing firm was proscribed if it resulted in an
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 1 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1958); parts pertinent read:
Section 1. . . . Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ...
Section 2.. . .Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ...
The act will be referred to frequently throughout this Note with full citation thereof
omitted. References to §§ 1 and 2 will always pertain to the sections of the Sherman Act.
2E.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
a Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
438 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1958). Throughout this
Note, reference will generally be to the popular name of the statute without complete ci-
tation. References to § 7 relate to the Clayton Act.
5 Clayton Act § 7, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 731 (1914) (amended by 64 Star. 1125 (1950),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 18 (1958)).
' In its original form, § 7 was aimed at the acquisition of stock in a competing firm;
hence another loophole remained-the acquisition of assets. This fact rendered § 7 largely
impotent in merger litigation until amended in 1950. 64. Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C.
5 18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731 (1914). Now, pertinent parts of § 7 read:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation sub-
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unreasonable restraint of trade or if it might have substantially les-
sened competition or tended to create monopoly. The two acts
are basically complimentary. The Clayton Act seeks to prevent in-
creases in market power; the Sherman Act seeks to prevent undue
exertion of market power.
II. THE RAILROAD CASES-THE GREAT COMPETING SYSTEMS TEST
Although the Government had relatively little success in attacking
mergers by use of the Sherman Act, there were several early cases
dealing with railroad consolidations that are notable exceptions. The
first major Sherman Act victory for the government was in Northern
Sec. Co. v. United States.8 Northern Securities was a holding com-
pany incorporated in New Jersey for the purpose of acquiring stock
in the Northern Pacific Railway and the Great Northern Railway,
which were parallel and competing lines extending from Duluth,
Minnesota, westward to Seattle. The Supreme Court held that the
holding company was a combination in restraint of trade which vio-
lated section 1 of the act. The Court concluded:
No scheme or device could more certainly come within the words of
the act . . . or could more effectively and certainly suppress free com-
petition between the constituent companies. . . . The mere existence
of such a combination and the power acquired by the holding com-
pany as its trustee, constitute a menace to, and a restraint upon, that
freedom of commerce which Congress intended to recognize and pro-
tect, and which the public is entitled to have protected.9
The Court offered no clear test for determining illegality." It
found an intent to eliminate all competition between the companies
through the holding company device but stated that intent to mo-
nopolize was not a necessary element of a violation. Furthermore, no
predatory practices were alleged-indeed, the combination was assailed
before any foul play could have transpired. It may be that, although
ject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend
to create a monopoly. (Emphasis added.)
'Hall & Phillips, Economic and Legal Aspects of Merger Litigation, 1951-1962, 10
U. Houston Bus. Rev. 1 (1963).
8193 U.S. 197 (1904).
9 Id. at 327.
"°The "rule of reason" was not enunciated until 1910 in the Standard Oil decision.
See text accompanying note 3 supra. The majority in Northern Securities rejected a
"reasonable" interpretation of § 1 although the concurring opinion urged the proposi-
tion. The concurring opinion indicates that use of the "rule of reason" would not have




the Government's case was ostensibly against the combination itself,
two other factors were important to the case. First, the litigation
apparently represented an indirect effort to attack the mechanism of
the holding company as a device for gaining monopoly power." The
second of these factors was an attempt to curtail the activities of the
so-called Robber Barons-Hill, Morgan, Stanford, Harriman and
others. These men were financial giants who literally controlled the
nation's purse strings." They were the brains behind the trusts and
the holding companies, and they fed upon these devices for con-
trolling industry and fleecing the public. The Government's victory
in the first railroad case was a great defeat to these institutions.
The second railroad case1 involved the Union Pacific Railroad Com-
pany's acquisition of stock in the Southern Pacific Company. The
Union Pacific's line extended from St. Louis westward to Ogden,
Utah, at which point it connected with the Central Pacific, whose
line terminated in San Francisco. 4 The Southern Pacific's tracks ex-
tended from New Orleans to San Francisco by way of Texas, New
Mexico, and Los Angeles. The Government sought to divest Union
Pacific of its forty-six percent stock interest in the Southern Pacific.
The Supreme Court upheld the Government and ordered divestment.
The Court inferred from the facts a scheme by which Union Pacific
was attempting to monopolize the competing roads and to suppress
competition.'" However, no predatory practices were alleged in the
pursuit of this scheme. Moreover, the percentage of competing traffic
was small, but the Court brushed this factor aside arguing that it
was large in dollar volume. The Court enunciated no specific test of
illegality but, again, only noted that "the consolidation of two
great competing systems of railroad engaged in interstate commerce
.. creates a combination which restrains interstate commerce
within the meaning of the statute."'" It is urged that the Court was
determined to stop further railroad consolidations. It apparently
shared a fear with the Government and the public-a fear that
monopolization in this vital transportation industry could place the
entire nation at the mercy of the railroads.
" See Handler, Industrial Mergers and the Anti-Trust Laws, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 179,
192 (1932).
" For a fascinating and revealing background to this era, see Josephson, The Robber
Barons (1962).
"United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912).
" This acquisition was later dissolved in the fourth railroad case. The fact that
Southern Pacific owned the Central Pacific was examined but was not the basis for the
decision. See text accompanying notes 19-20 infra.
"United States v. Union Pac. R.R., 226 U.S. 61, 95 (1912).
'
6 1d. at 88. (Emphasis added.)
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In United States v. Reading Co.," the Government sought to dis-
solve a holding company the alleged purpose of which was to control
the production and transportation of coal from the vast Schuylkill
region of Pennsylvania. If such a purpose could have been effected,
the holding company would have controlled practically the entire
supply and distribution system for coal in the eastern United States.
The Supreme Court, in upholding the Government, concluded that
the holding company represented a calculated purchase for control of
great competing carriers and great competing companies and, thus,
was condemned by the Sherman Act.1" Again, no real test of illegality
was advanced by the Court, but the emphasis was placed on the
presence of great competing firms and the elimination of competi-
tion between them through the holding company device. The Court
noted that this factor was enough to render the combination unlaw-
ful without more. Hence, although the Court found that an intent
to monopolize existed and that the railroad had engaged in such
predatory practices as suppressing the building of a competing line,
these factors apparently were not necessary to the decision.
In the fourth railroad case, the Government alleged as a violation
of section 1 the ownership by the Southern Pacific Railway of con-
trolling stock interest in the Central Pacific Railway." As is noted
above, the Central Pacific ran from San Francisco to Ogden where
it connected with the Union Pacific, thus constituting a northern
transcontinental system. The Southern Pacific constituted a southern
transcontinental system. The Supreme Court upheld the Government
and ordered divestment of the stock and cancellation of a lease agree-
ment between the two systems. A specific intent to monopolize was
found but there were no predatory practices involved. The Court
again expressed concern about the combination of two "giant" systems
of transportation and cited the previous three cases as collectively
establishing that "one system of railroad transportation cannot acquire
another, nor a substantial and vital part thereof, when the effect of
such acquisition is to suppress or materially reduce the free and
normal flow of competition in the channels of interstate trade.""0
The most significant thread to be found running through these four
decisions is the element of great competing systems. Because of the
importance of railroad transportation and the gigantic nature of
railroad operations at the time of these decisions, the adjective is ap-
propriate and the Court's concern understandable. Predatory prac-
17253 U.S. 26 (1920).
8 1d. at 59.




tices were found to exist in only one of the cases, Reading, but this
factor was not crucial to that decision. A specific intent to monopo-
lize was found in each case but neither was this fact controlling. The
controlling factor appears to have been the elimination of competi-
tion between great firms.
III. COLUMBIA STEEL-THE LEGITIMATE BUSINESS DEFENSE
The last attempt before 1950 to apply section 1 of the Sherman
Act to mergers or acquisitions was in United States v. Columbia Steel
Co."s In that case the Government sought to prevent the acquisition
of Consolidated Steel Corporation by United States Steel Corporation
through its wholly owned subsidiary, Columbia Steel Company. The
Government charged that the purchase would result in the exclusion
of all manufacturers except United States Steel from the business of
supplying Consolidated's requirements for rolled steel products. These
requirements totaled less than one half of one percent of the national
market or three percent of the market area of eleven western states
and amounted to slightly more than two million dollars over the pre-
ceding ten-year period. Such an exclusion, according to the Govern-
ment, constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of
section 1."' In support of its contention the Government cited the
railroad cases for the proposition that "control by one competitor
over another violates the Sherman Act, even though the percentage
of business for which they compete may be small."' The Court dis-
posed of the railroad cases by simply noting that their facts were so
dissimilar that they afforded little guidance. The Court held that the
Government had failed to prove its case and that the restraint of
trade was not unreasonable.
No predatory practices were found nor was any intent to restrain
trade alleged. The Court did attempt to define a standard of illegality.
It was suggested that many factors be considered in determining what
constitutes an unreasonable restraint under the Sherman Act. Among
the considerations are the percentage of business controlled, the
strength of remaining competition, the purpose (legitimate or other-
wise) of the acquisition, and the peculiar characteristics of the
product market or area market.'" As for market percentages, the
"334 U.S. 495 (1948).
s226 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 UI.S.C. S 1 (1958). It was alleged further
that the elimination of existing competition between Consolidated and United States Steel
in the sale of structural fabricated products and pipe was a violation of S 1.
23United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531 (1948).24 Id. at 527-28.
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Court refused to specify what was unreasonable, noting that this
"varies with the setting in which that factor is placed.""'
Turning its attention to the application of the test of illegality to
the facts, the Court emphasized the purpose of the acquisition and
concluded that it reflected a "normal business purpose rather than a
scheme to circumvent the law."2 This factor, namely the legitimacy
of the acquisition, was ostensibly controlling. However, it is urged
that the peculiar circumstances regarding United States Steel's pur-
chase of its rolled steel plant at Geneva, Utah, from the Government
tainted this litigation with what has been properly labeled "quasi-
estoppel." The Court gave extensive treatment to the facts sur-
rounding the purchase. The Government had urged United States
Steel to submit a bid for the Geneva plant and the Attorney General
had approved the proposed purchase so as to relieve United States
Steel of any fears of antitrust repercussions. Hence, the Government
was in a precarious position when United States Steel sought to
assure itself a market for Geneva's products by purchasing Con-
solidated.'7
Although the Court had proposed a test for illegality, that test is
ambiguous at best. This fact, coupled with the perfunctory treatment
of the railroad cases, left the law in a confused state with respect to
the application of section 1 to mergers and acquisitions.
IV. LEXINGTON BANK"-THE MAJOR COMPETITIVE FACTOR TEST
In 1961, the merger of the First National Bank and Trust Com-
pany and Security Trust Company, both of Lexington, Kentucky, was
approved by the Comptroller of the Currency" notwithstanding re-
ports submitted by the Attorney General, the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, and the Board of Governers of the Federal Reserve
System, each of which concluded that competition among commercial
banks in Fayette County would be adversely affected by the proposed
as Id. at 528.
"Id. at 533. The court seems to indicate that if a showing of anticompetitive effect had
been made the acquisition would have been unlawful. The legitimate business defense em-
phasizes the motive behind a merger or acquisition and the many legitimate reasons for
such a move. In this case the motive was to insure a market for the Geneva plant's pro-
ducts. Legitimate purposes could encompass any number of factors-desire to achieve
economies of scale, to capitalize on technological advances, to enter a new market with-
out internal expansion, etc. The emphasis is placed not so much on the structural char-
acteristics as on performance features and the effect of the merger or acquisition on this
performance.
"TFor an extensive analysis of the opinion and surrounding facts, see Note, 58 Yale
L.J. 764. (1949).
"s United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376 U.S. 665 (1964).
"'Pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C.
§ 1828(c) (Supp. II, 1961).
1964]
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combination. Prior to the consolidation, First National and Security
Trust ranked (of six competitors) first and fourth respectively in
Fayette County in commercial bank assets, deposits, and loans. In
trust department business, the respective positions were reversed. The
proposed combination would possess 52.7 per cent of bank assets,
51.59 per cent of deposits, and 54.2 per cent of the loans in the area.
The combined trust assets would approach ninety-five per cent with
only four other competitors in this field.
The Government challenged the merger a° under sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act urging that it constituted an unreasonable
restraint of trade in the field of commercial banking (the relevant
product market) in Fayette County (the relevant market area)."
The complaint was dismissed by the trial court" but, on direct appeal,
the Supreme Court reversed, holding that "where merging companies
are major competitive factors in a relevant market, the elimination
of significant competition between them, by merger or consolida-
tion, itself constitutes a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.""3
Considering the large portion of the relevant market shared by the
two banks, the merger would, indeed, eliminate significant competi-
tion in that market.
The Court concluded that the case was governed by the railroad
cases. ' In Lexington Bank, no intent to monopolize was alleged.
Although such an intent was found in each of the railroad cases, that
factor was never considered controlling by the Court.a" Neither did
the government allege any predatory practices in the instant case. In
only one of the railroad cases were such practices alleged and this
factor was not considered controlling in that case.
The single factor of the railroad cases that remains from which the
Lexington Bank holding supposedly is drawn is the elimination of
some competition between great competing systems of transportation
or great competing firms. But in applying this principle to the merger
a"United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), settled the issue
of immunity of banks to antitrust litigation. Neither the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 74
Stat. 129 (1960), 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. II, 1961), nor the fact that banks al-
ready are regulated, renders banks immune to merger litigation. The application of the
Clayton Act to bank mergers was established in this same case.
31 The "factor of inconvenience" in the field of commercial banking localized the market
area while the overall unique features of commercial banking defined the product market.
376 U.S. at 667-68.
" United States v. First Nat'l. Bank & Trust Co., 208 F. Supp. 457 (E.D. Ky. 1962).
33 376 U.S. at 671-72. Since the Court found that the merger violated § 1, it was not
necessary to consider the alleged violation of § 2 or to examine the impact of the merger
on trust business in the area.3 4 See discussion of the railroad cases in text accompanying notes 8-20 supra. It is not-
able that in those cases percentage shares of the relevant market were not conclusive; it
was the enormous dollar volume of competing business that was considered controlling.
"See paragraph of text following note 20 supra.
[Vol. 18
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of two banks in Lexingon, Kentucky, the Court has used the term
"major competitive factors." It is difficult to reconcile the terms
"great competing systems" and "major competitive factors" in the
context of antitrust law. The former was applied to the combina-
tions of massive systems of transportation with social and economic
significance that is unmatched by anything in modern life." The lat-
ter term has been applied in only one case and is, as yet, undefined.
In terms of abstract economic principles a railroad merger may be
analogous to a bank merger in a given market. But, in the final
analysis, one must view the railroad cases in their unique factual
context." Indeed, the peculiar facts of the railroad cases accounted
for their rejection by the Court as precedent in Columbia Steel."
In Lexington Bank, the Court limits Columbia Steel to its special
facts. The implication of this is unclear. As noted earlier, Columbia
Steel allegedly recognized a defense of "legitimate business purpose"
to a section 1 charge." The Lexington Bank opinion raises a question
concerning the validity of such a defense in future antitrust cases. '
Apparently, once the Government has established that merging com-
panies control a high enough percentage of the relevant market so as
to justify invoking the term "major competitive factors," the motive
behind the acquisition is irrelevant. The question of legitimate busi-
ness purpose or any other indicia of market performance must give
way to the purely structural considerations of market shares. The
dissenting opinion recognizes the danger of ignoring market per-
formance and warns against condemning this or any merger on the
principle of " 'bigness' alone." 1 Indeed, if no defenses save "failing
firm"'" are available, such a merger appears to be very close to a
per se violation."
V. THE MERGER OF SECTION 1 AND SECTION 7
Until this decision, one principle seemed well-established-namely,
38 See Josephson, op. cit. supra note 12.
" See discussion of railroad cases in text accompanying notes 8-20 supra.
"SUnited States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). See text accompanying
note 23 supra.
38 See note 26 supra.
' It appears that the only "special facts" to which the court could have referred in
limiting Columbia Steel are those which gave rise to "quasi-estoppel." See text accompanying
note 27 supra.
4' 376 U.S. at 676.
'2 Under the test enunciated, if a party to a merger were a failing firm, it can be as-
sumed that this firm would not be considered a "major competitive factor" and, hence,
the test would not apply.
"' Justice Department Views on Sherman Act Merger Cases, 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 5 50235
at 55293, in which the Antitrust Division Chief of the Justice Department is quoted as say-
ing: "In the future .. . it may be that we no more need to examine the market impact of
horizontal mergers than we need to examine the market impact of price-fixing agreements."
1964]
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it was more difficult to challenge a merger under the Sherman Act
than under the amended Clayton Act." The dissent contended that
the Government had not proved its case under the stricter statute
but had presented "a Clayton Act case masquerading in the garb of
the Sherman Act."" But this case may well have established that the
Clayton Act test is no stricter than that of the Sherman Act. The
majority is criticized for treating section 7 and section 1 as inter-
changeable ;40 but recent decisions indicate that this is what the Court
has, in fact, done and will continue to do. An examination of some
of these recent section 7 decisions clearly reveals this tendency.
The most significant section 7 decision in years was United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank,4" a case which is strikingly similar to
Lexington Bank. In Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, the Court held that "a
merger which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in the market, is so inherently likely to lessen
competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of
evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have such
anticompetitive effects."8 Ostensibly, this amounts to a prima facia
test as opposed to what this writer suggests may be a per se violation
in Lexington Bank. But again it appears that only structural con-
siderations were decisive (the merger involved thirty per cent of the
relevant market) because the Court flatly rejected any defenses pre-
dicated on market performance."' In short, the burden of rebutting
4464 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958); see Note, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 766,
781 (1952). The writer confidently notes that "one of the few statements about the amend-
ment to § 7 that can be made with certainty is that it embodies a test of illegality stricter
than that of the Sherman Act. Beyond this the interpretation of the statute is left largely
to the courts."
" "One can hardly doubt that it comes to us under these false colors only because the
decision last Term [United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, see text accompanying notes
47-48 infra] that bank mergers could be reached under the Clayton Act was indeed a sur-
prise to the Government." 376 U.S. at 679.
" 376 U.S. at 679 n. 10. Mr. Justice Reed laid open the way for this development in
Columbia Steel. In an ominous footnote he suggested that the public policy enunciated by
§ 7 of the Clayton Act be considered when determining whether a given acquisition vio-
lates the Sherman Act. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 507 (1948).
See Note 58 Yale L. J. 764, 771 (1949), in which the author points out that this was the
first merger case in which such a proposition was advanced. It was further suggested that
the dissenter in the Columbia Sleel Case would be more likely to support this point of view
than the majority. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote the dissent in that case and now his opinion
is that of the majority in Lexington Bank.
47374 U.S. 321 (1963).
41 Id. at 363.
" Three such defenses were specifically rejected by the Court. Philadelphia National Bank
urged: (1) that only through the merger could it follow its customers to the suburbs; (2)
that the increased lending limit would allow the new bank to compete effectively with the
larger New York banks for business, and (3) that the city of Philadelphia would profit
from having a larger bank which could stimulate economic development in the area by at-
tracting new business. Id. at 370-71.
the presumption of a violation is practically unsustainable and one
can find little, if any, distinction between the tests in the two de-
cisions even though they are based on different laws.
In his most recent opinion to date on the subject,"0 Mr. Justice
Douglas, writing for the majority, proscribed the acquisition of Rome
Cable by Alcoa. Although this was a section 7 case, the Court empha-
sized the importance of keeping Rome as an "important competitive
factor" and noted the "substantial" nature of Rome's competition.
The Rome case was ostensibly governed by Philadelphia Nat'l Bank;
but the language is so similar to Lexington Bank that one must con-
clude that Mr. Justice Douglas has, at last, carried the day51 and that
section 7 and section 1 can be used almost interchangeably for
merger litigation.
A look at recent section 7 cases may also give an indication as to
the market percentages which the Court might consider prohibitive
under the Sherman Act. Lexington Bank involved fifty per cent of
the market, but from the Philadelphia Nat'l Bank decision one can
infer that the Court would outlaw a merger under section 1 if thirty
per cent were involved." In United States v. Continental Can Co.,
53
a section 7 case and the Court's most recent pronouncement to date
on market shares, the Court outlawed a combination affecting twenty-
five per cent of the relevant market. Mr. Justice White cited Phila-
delphia Nat'l Bank and concluded that twenty-five per cent was close
enough to the market share outlawed in that case to be considered
unlawful. One can only speculate as to how far this reasoning will
be pursued.
It is reasonable to conclude that, given a high percentage of the
relevant market controlled in a merger or acquisition, the Court
will apply the same test under section 1 or section 7. But in a close
case in which structural considerations are not as imposing, would
the Court entertain defenses based on market performance? If this
question is answered in the affirmative, another question remains.
Would the fact that the combination was challenged under section
1 or section 7 influence the point at which these defenses would be
heard or would the same structural scale apply under either act?
Anthony D. Schlesinger
5 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
5' Note Mr. Justice Douglas' strong dissent in Columbia Steel. He now has apparently
convinced a majority of the Court and may be able to take the law in whatever direction
he wishes.
"eUnited States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). The Court
specifically noted the threat to competition where 30% of the market is involved.
53 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
1964) NOTES
